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CASE DIGEST
I. ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc.
570 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
During the Nicaraguan civil war in 1979, Salvador Bandes,
president and majority stockholder of Industria Nacional de
Clavos y Alhambres de Puas (INCA), fled from Nicaragua and the
Sandinista revolutionary forces "intervened" in INCA. Shortly
before Bandes's departure, INCA had paid $460,000 to an Ameri-
can firm, Harlow and Jones, Inc. (H & J), for steel billets which
were never delivered. Bandes entered into negotiations with H & J
for a refund of the payment. Prior to the settlement, however, in-
terventor Alvarez informed H & J that he, as the Nicaraguan state
Fideicommissary, was the only authorized representative of INCA.
H & J brought an action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, interpleading Bandes and
Alvarez, to determine who the proper recipient of the refund
should be. Bandes asserted that since the interpleader fund was
written in the United States and in light of the fact that the confis-
catory actions of the Nicaraguan Government Council were incon-
sistent with United States laws and policy, the court was not re-
quired to give any legal effect to those actions. Alvarez maintained,
however, that the intervention of INCA was not a permanent tak-
ing because, under decrees enacted by the Government Council,
Bandes had a right to seek redress by appearing in person before
the Nicaraguan Attorney General to contest the confiscation of his
property within thirty days of the intervention.
The district court granted Bandes's motion for summary judg-
ment. It held that, under the act of state doctrine, which precludes
judicial scrutiny of politically-sensitive foreign affairs, no effect
could be given to the intervention of INCA, and that the refund
should be returned to Bandes, the rightful representative of INCA.
The court noted that, although the act of state doctrine did not
mandate a "hands-off attitude" when confiscated property was lo-
cated in the United States, the court could not give effect to the
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foreign state's action, since the taking had been without compensa-
tion, and was, therefore, contrary to the laws and policy of the
United States.
II. COMMERCE
Moyglare Stud Farm Ltd. v. Due Process Stable, Inc.
569 F. Supp. 1565 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
In this diversity action, the plaintiff, Moyglare Stud Farm,
Ltd., an Irish corporation, seeks a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine whether the defendant's revocation of a contract of sale is
invalid. The contract calls for the sale of a thoroughbred racehorse
for $1 million, with annual payments of $250,000 to be made dur-
ing the four years following the sale. Negotiations regarding the
transaction took place in Florida, New Jersey and New York. Pur-
suant to the defendant's request, a stipulation that New Jersey law
was to apply to the contract and that delivery of the horse was to
take place in New Jersey was included in the contract. Eighteen
months after delivery, defendant notified Moyglare that it was re-
voking its acceptance of the horse due to a concealed injury pre-
sent at the time of sale.
Defendant contends that, since plaintiff, a corporation neither
registered nor authorized to do business in New Jersey, did not
comply with the Corporation Business Activities Reporting Act,
N.J.S.A. 14A:13-14 et seq. it was barred from bringing suit on the
contract. The district court held that although New Jersey law
must apply in the case sub judice, it was unnecessary to dismiss
the complaint under the state's door-closing statute. Pursuant to
subsection C of N.J.S.A. 14A:13-20, the court has the power to ex-
cuse the corporation's failure to file a timely report and allow
plaintiff access to the courts. Further, the district court held that
the plaintiff had subsequently filed the appropriate reports and
did not intentionally evade New Jersey taxes or knowingly avoid
the state's reporting requirements.
The court found that the statute was meant to act essentially
as an information gathering device rather than as a punishment of
foreign entities for their ignorance of New Jersey law. The court
concluded that an isolated transaction occurring in an interstate
forum should not preclude a party from asserting a claim due to its





569 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983)
Plaintiff, a member of the California State Senate and the
California State Bar, brought this action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611,
et seq., ("Act") which requires each "agent of a foreign principal"
to register with the Attorney General of the United States. The act
required all registrants to supply the Attorney General with two
copies of any "political propaganda" intended for dissemination in
the United States. The plaintiff argued that the challenged
prohibitions infringed upon his first amendment right of free
speech. Plaintiff alledged that, if his Canadian films on nuclear
weaponry and acid rain were labelled as "political propaganda," he
would be branded as a purveyor of propaganda and which would
thus have an adverse impact on his professional and personal repu-
tation as an attorney and a state senator. The plaintiff moved for a
preliminary injunction and defendants moved to dismiss.
The court held that the plaintiff had demonstrated his stand-
ing to sue by exhibiting (1) that he had suffered, or would immi-
nently suffer, some injury, (2) that the injury could fairly be traced
to the challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury could be reme-
died on an exercise of the court's power. First, the court found that
the plaintiff's injury was "real and immediate" because of his in-
ability to present his ideas to the public for an evaluation of their
merits due to the characterization of those ideas as "political prop-
aganda." Second, such a characterization of his films would deni-
grate the contents of the films and vilify the plaintiff as a purveyor
of propaganda. The court found that, as a "direct" and "traceable"
consequence of the defendant's conduct, there would be a rejection
of the plaintiff's ideas. Third, the court concluded that the plaintiff
had sought the appropriate judicial remedy through an injunction.
It noted that he had demonstrated the existence of serious ques-
tions meriting litigation and had shown the significantly heavier
burden of hardship.
The court held that each day the plaintiff's films were unavail-
able to him as a medium of communication, his first amendment
right of freedom of speech was abridged. This hardship was far
greater than any likely to befall the defendant from a denial of a
preliminary injunction. Finally, the court determined that there
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was a sufficient basis in both law and fact to enjoin the defendant
from characterizing the films as "political propaganda."
IV. CUSTOMS DUTIES
Schaper Manufacturing Co. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission
717 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Schaper Manufacturing Co., (Schaper) a toy manufacturing
company, and A. Eddy Goldfarb, (Goldfarb) a toy and game inven-
tor sought review of a United States International Trade Commis-
sion (I.T.C.) order dismissing their complaint in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Plaintiffs initially brought suit
under the Tariff Act of 1930, (19 U.S.C. § 1337) for unfair trade
practices and patent infringement, alleging that certain importers
had copied their design of a toy vehicle and were importing such
copies without designating the true source of the toy's design. The
I.T.C. dismissed the action on the grounds that the unfair prac-
tices did not affect or injure "an industry efficiently and economi-
cally operated in the United States" and therefore the claim did
not come within the scope of the Tariff Act. The U.S. Court of
Appeals agreed with the ITC.
In starting with the premise that the definition of "United
States" is geographical and not based on citizenship, the court
found that the production of the toy vehicle was not an industry
within the U.S. Although the original design and specifications
were developed in the U.S. and Schaper made quality control in-
spections in the U.S., the fact that all of the manufacturing and
packaging took place in Hong Kong removed Schaper and Gold-
farb from the purview of the Act.
The court construed the statute consistently with Congres-
sional intent and noted that Congress did not intend to protect
American importers like Schaper, who cause the imported item to
be produced for them abroad and engage in relatively small non-
promotional and non-financial activity in this country. Further-
more, even if present-day economic realities call for broader defini-
tions to protect American interests, the court found that it would




Lasky v. Continental Products Corp.
569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.Pa. 1983)
Lasky brought a products liability action against Continental
Gummi-Werke, Aktiengesellschaft (CGW), a corporation organized
under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, seeking to re-
cover damages for injuries sustained in an accident allegedly
caused by defective tires manufactured by CGW. He then pro-
ceeded by serving interrogatories and a request for production of
documents on CGW. In response, CGW moved for a protective or-
der requiring that all discovery be done in accordance with the
provisions of the Hague Convention.
The court denied the motion because no evidence was
presented to show that discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would violate German law. Although the Convention
specifies that letters of request are the only method of compelling
the production of evidence in foreign countries, the language is
permissive. Article 27 states: "[the Convention] shall not prevent a
Contracting State from .... permitting by internal law or prac-
tice, methods, of taking evidence other than those provided for in
the Convention." The court concluded that if it had followed the
general provisions of the treaty, the plaintiffs would have been pre-
cluded from obtaining valuable evidence since West Germany does
not execute letters of request for the purpose of obtaining pretrial
discovery of documents.
VI. DUMPING
Armco, Inc. v. United States
570 F. Supp. 51 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1983)
Armco, a domestic steel manufacturer, brought an action to
review a determination by the United States Trade Commission
that the United States steel industry had not been materially in-
jured by the importation and sale of Korean steel wire nails in the
United States. Armco claimed that it had been materially injured
by sales of Korean steel wire nails in the United States market
below the trigger price. Armco moved for summary judgment and
for preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the liquidations of any
entries of those products after May 23, 1978 and before February
2, 1978. They also sought to have the case remanded to the Trade
19841
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Commission for a determination as to whether any false, fictitious
or fraudulent representations in the administrative record had af-
fected the Commission's conclusions. Armco further requested that
all liquidations or entries made after December 14, 1982 on mer-
chandise which entered between May 23, 1980 and February 28,
1982 be set aside and stayed. This case resulted from one of Trea-
sury Department's antidumping investigations based on informa-
tion obtained from the "trigger mechanism." Under this procedure,
prices of imported steel mill products were monitored, and sales
below the allowable trigger price, or fair value price, were targeted
for antidumping investigation pursuant to the Antidumping Act of
1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (repealed 1979).
An investigation of Korean products was conducted because a
survey of shipments of Korean steel wire nails from May 1, 1978 to
May 28, 1978 indicated that twenty-two of thirty-three Korean
companies were selling such products to the United States below
the target price. In August of 1982, the United States International
Trade Commission found that less-than-fair-value imports were
causing material injuries to domestic industries. Accordingly, an-
tidumping duties were imposed on Korean steel wire nails which
entered the United States on or after February 3, 1982.1 This regu-
lation required that Korean companies file deposits in the amount
of their estimated antidumping duties upon the entry of Korean
nails into the United States.
The Court of International Trade denied Armco's motion for
summary judgment and refused to grant the requested preliminary
injunction, holding that Armco had not established a nexus be-
tween its loss of sales and Korea's failure to uphold the United
State's dumping duties. The court found that Armco also failed to
show the threat of immediate irreparable harm which is necessary
to justify the grant of an injunction. The court reasoned that the
nails had long since entered domestic commerce and were not af-
fected by antidumping duties currently imposed on the Korean
merchandise pursuant to 47 Fed. Reg. 35266.
Armco's motion for remand was also denied based on the
court's finding that Armco had not shown that the Korean nails
caused any injury to domestic industries. Finally, the court con-
cluded that since Armco had failed to seek and obtain a timely
injunction to prevent liquidation of the entry of the Korean nails
1. 47 Fed. Reg. 35266 (Aug. 13, 1982).
[Vol. 15:3
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during the period of initial monitoring, their motion to set aside
the liquidations covering merchandise which entered between May
23, 1980 and February 2, 1982 should also be denied.
VII. IMMIGRATION
Bahramizadeh v. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service
717 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1983)
Bahramizadeh, a native of Iran, posted a $3,000 maintenance
of status and departure bond as a condition for entry into the
United States as a nonimmigrant student. The bond stipulated two
conditions to which Bahramizadeh agreed. The conditions were:
(1) not to overstay the one year term authorized by the bond; and,
(2) not to accept employment in the United States without the
permission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
With the permission of the INS, Bahramizadeh extended the
bond's one year term. During this extended period, he married a
United States citizen who filed a petition on his behalf with the
INS seeking to obtain an immigrant visa. Before the INS processed
this petition, Bahramizadeh visited his local INS office twice in or-
der to facilitate the processing of the petition and to extend his
student visa which was about to expire. After the expiration of the
student visa, Bahramizadeh again visited the INS office. An official
of the INS advised Bahramizadeh during each visit that the INS
was aware of his circumstances and, due to his wife's pending peti-
tion, he need not extend his student visa.
The INS subsequently granted the wife's petition after a con-
siderable length of time due to administrative delays. Shortly
thereafter, the INS notified Bahramizadeh that he had forfeited
the $3,000 bond which he had posted for his student visa because
he had breached its terms by overstaying the stipulated time limit.
After exhausting all administrative avenues of review, Bah-
ramizadeh filed a complaint in the applicable district court. The
court granted the INS's motion for summary judgment because
they found that Bahramizadeh had breached the terms of the
bond.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that, pursuant to 8
C.F.R. 103.6(c)(3), a bond forfeiture required a substantial viola-
tion of the bond's terms. The court held that the current INS in-
terpretation of a "substantial violation" was inconsistent with the
19841
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express wording of the statute and was also inconsistent with the
legislative intent behind the statute because the Commission which
drafted it had effectively read the requirement of "substantial" out
of the regulation. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether the violation was
"substantial" in light of the fact that Bahramizadeh made good
faith and reasonable efforts to comply with the bond's terms. The
district court's findings in this case may provide guidelines for fu-
ture interpretations determining which acts constitute a substan-
tial violation of a maintenance of status and departure bond.
VIII. JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Mendaro v. World Bank
717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
Susana Mendaro, an employee of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), brought suit
against the bank under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e) to 2000(e)-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), alleging that
during her term of employment she was a victim of sexual harass-
ment and discrimination. She claimed that her subsequent termi-
nation was a retaliatory action on the part of the Bank. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission dismissed Mendaro's com-
plaint on the ground that they lacked jurisdiction, finding that the
World Bank was an international governmental agency and was
not subject to the laws of the United States.
Ms. Mendaro then filed the present suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The Bank moved to
dismiss on the grounds that, as an international government organ-
ization, its internal affairs are not subject to the jurisdictions of its
member states. Mendaro argued that under article VII section 3 of
the Article of Agreement of the World Bank, 27 December 1945, 60
St. at 1440, 2 UNTS 134, the Bank effectively waived any immu-
nity from suit provided by the International Organizations Immu-
nities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288-288i (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Article VII,
section 3 permits actions to be brought against the World Bank in
a "court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in
which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the pur-
pose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guar-
anteed securities." The district court declined to follow Mendaro's
broad interpretation of article VII section 3, and dismissed the ac-
[Vol. 15:3
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tion for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, affirmed
the decision of the district court. It interpreted article VII, section
3 narrowly as a result of the International Organizations Immuni-
ties Act. The Act, and case law under it, hold that the immunity of
an international organization must be expressly waived. The court
found no such express waiver.
The court reasoned that subjecting aspects of the internal op-
erations of the World Bank, such as employee relations, to the ju-
risdiction of the courts of its member states, would disrupt the
operation of the Bank. The court found that international organi-
zations such as the World Bank, owe their allegiance not to indi-
vidual governments, but to principles and policies. A waiver of im-
munity would force the World Bank to comply with the often
conflicting employment laws of its member states. The court found
that it would be administratively burdensome for Bank officers, re-
sponsible for carrying out the essential purposes of the organiza-
tion, to concern themselves with the employment laws of member
states.
This case is significant because it ensures that the internal af-
fairs of international organizations will not be subject to the juris-
diction of United States courts. Absent an express waiver of immu-
nity, international organizations such as the World Bank, can
conduct the activities for which they were chartered, free from
compliance with individual state's laws.
IX. TRADE ACT
Abbott v. Donovan
570 F. Supp. 41 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)
In 1980, Local 113 of the Allied Industrial Workers of America
filed a petition with the Department of Labor's Office of Trade Ad-
justment Assistance (OTAA) requesting a certification of eligibility
for trade adjustment assistance benefits under the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) for all em-
ployees of the Dana Corporation's Marion, Indiana plant. The Sec-
retary of Labor concluded that increases in imports of articles sim-
ilar to or directly competitive with such products as journal crosses
and bearing races produced at the Marion plant significantly con-
tributed to the decline in sales and/or production and to the total
or partial separation of workers at that plant. Only those workers
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engaged in employment related to the affected articles were certi-
fied for eligibility. Plaintiff's request for administrative reconsider-
ation as to the remaining employees was granted, and, upon the
Secretary's reaffirmation of the prior decision, they sought judicial
relief in the United States Court of International Trade.
Plaintiffs presented four questions to the court for considera-
tion. First, they requested the court to determine whether OTAA's
failure to conduct a field investigation was an abuse of discretion.
The court found that OTAA did not abuse its discretion in con-
ducting its investigation by mail because both the nature and ex-
tent of an investigation are matters which rest within the sound
discretion of the Secretary of Labor.
Second, they asked the court to consider whether all of the
employees at the Marion plant constituted an appropriate subdivi-
sion of the firm. Under the Trade Act, the Secretary of Labor may
certify as eligible for trade adjustment assistance benefits only
those workers who were employed in the subdivision that produces
the article that was adversely affected by imports of like or directly
competitive articles.
Third, the plaintiffs requested a determination as to whether
the Secretary of Labor erred in refusing to find service workers
who provided ancillary and support services to both certified and
non-certified departments eligible for trade adjustment assistance.
The court concluded that service workers may not be certified as
eligible for trade adjustment assistance benefits unless there is an
important causal nexus between increased imports and the layoff
of service workers. The Department of Labor has interpreted the
Trade Act as requiring that at least 25 percent of the service work-
ers' activity be expended in service to the subdivision which pro-
duces the import-impacted article. The court remanded this part
of the action on the grounds that the Secretary's determination
was not supported by substantial evidence in that the administra-
tive record contained no data supporting the Secretary's findings
that significantly less than 25 percent of the service workers' activ-
ity was expended in service to the certified departments.
Finally, they sought a judgment as to whether the Secretary's
determination resulted in dissimilar treatment of similarly situated
workers without a rational basis in violation of their constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the law. The court stated that the
different treatment resulted not from arbitrary, capricious or im-
proper distinctions by the Secretary, but rather from a proper in-
[Vol. 15:3
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terpretation of the statute. The class of workers denied certifica-
tion did not satisfy the criteria of the statute because they were
not involved in producing articles directly affected by increased
imports of similar or directly competitive articles.
